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Abstract
State and Federal legislation governing health information and privacy in Australia is complex
and relatively untested, causing confusion amongst database custodians as to what conduct is
required. Some database custodians believe that providing privacy will allay public anxiety and
consequently support research. Others argue that data managers have become fearful of litigation
and that this will restrict the access of researchers to data. Two of the significant ethical issues to
be considered are the right to privacy, and whether using information poses a risk to data subjects.
Data custodians have sought to address concerns about privacy in two main ways. The first is by
seeking informed consent from those whose data is collected. There are significant, but not insurmountable, practical difficulties in seeking consent from large numbers of individuals. The second
way of addressing privacy concerns has been through security measures which are designed to
reduce risks to data subjects. These measures are often nominated as a response to privacy requirements; however, they do not necessarily offer the opportunity to consent to information disclosures.
In this paper we present a review of the current literature on possible responses of database
custodians to demands for increased privacy. We outline a variety of examples and responses, some
of which have the effect of restricting research, while others are enabling research to proceed with
greater privacy protection in place. We argue that finding ways to proceed with research while
protecting privacy requires attention to a range of factors. There are challenges both in engaging
populations about consent procedures, and in encouraging the use by researchers and health care
professionals of technical solutions where these are available.
Keywords: Confidentiality, Privacy, Ethics, Research, Medical records

1 Introduction
Legislation expanding the control
which individuals may exercise over the
use and disclosure of personal (and
especially health) information has
placed new demands upon registries
and other database custodians. New
legislation includes amendment of the
Commonwealth Privacy Act to apply
to all health information in the private
sector and introduction of health specific privacy legislation in a number of

Australian states. These changes, in
addition to pre existing common law
protection for confidential information,
have produced a complex legal environment in Australia which is relatively
untested. Not surprisingly, health data
custodians have been confused as to
the most appropriate response. There
has been considerable professional
discussion concerning what conduct
is required to comply with the various
requirements of different statutes. The
response of database custodians to

demands for increased privacy protection has been mixed, while the ultimate
impact on research productivity is not
yet clear.
In this paper we acknowledge the
problems which health data custodians confront in providing privacy protection, consider the ethical issues
involved and review some of the responses of database custodians. The
main responses have been to seek individual consent for the inclusion and
use of data in registries and databases,
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and to devise business rules which
reduce the likelihood that clinical data
can be traced back to the individuals
who were its source.

2 Data protection may
restrict or enable
research
Some registry custodians support
the practice of giving individuals the
opportunity to consent, on the
grounds that public confidence is necessary if research is to proceed. James
Morrow has said of the UK Epilepsy
and Pregnancy Register that while
‘case ascertainment would probably be
higher if informed consent was not
necessary, this is an inevitable trade
off to maintain patients’ trust’ (Morrow 2001). In their analysis of the statutory regulation of confidentiality and
privacy affecting the National Cancer
Institute Breast Cancer Surveillance
Consortium, which has a centralised
register of mammographic data in the
United States, Carney et al point out
that the public are increasingly aware
of instances of misuse of health
records. They argue that providing
privacy guarantees is the antidote to
public mistrust:
For research studies to gain the participation needed by the public, the
confidentiality of research data must
be honored and protected. Otherwise
it will be impossible to conduct research
(Carney, Geller et al. 2000 p 377).
Other health data custodians have
voiced their concern at the impact
which increasing privacy protection
will have on research. A case report
from custodians of a large data repository in the USA notes that
Recent deliberations over Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements have
cast a specter of concern over any secondary uses of data from electronic
medical records systems (Moehr and
Daniel 1998 p 394).
Custodians of medical data in the
United Kingdom complain of confusion caused by the Data Protection Act
(Stroble, Cave et al. 2000; Coleman,
Evans et al. 2003). Database custodians are said to be “fearful of litigation

if they allow any access for research
or even audit without each patient’s
informed consent” (Peto and Fletcher
2004).
Researchers report that some custodians of health data have become “reluctant to continue supplying data to
researchers” with the result that epidemiological research “is threatened
by too rigid and inconsistent interpretation of the Data Protection Act”
(Evans, McNaughton et al. 2001 p 672).
There are reports of increasing difficulty in identifying suitable research
subjects for recruitment (Redsell and
Cheater 2001) and complaints that compliance with the Data Protection Act is
expensive and time consuming, drains
resources (Evans, McNaughton et al.
2001) and acts as an obstacle to research (Peto and Fletcher 2004).

3 The ethical issues
From an ethical perspective, there are
three main issues at stake. One is the
important benefit to society gained
from medical research. Preservation of
this public good may justify forgoing
some other public or private benefits.
This is the position taken by the National Health and Medical Research
Council in its ethical guidelines on research (NHMRC 1999).
A second is the right to privacy, supported by legislation, which emphasises the importance of people being
able to decide freely who should have
access to their personal information.
The right to privacy is recognised by
researchers and custodians who accept
that most patients wish to exercise
control over whether their health information is used in research (Fletcher,
Marriott et al. 2004; Billings, Kohn et
al. 1992; Sankar, Mora et al. 2003).
The third ethical issue revolves
around whether or not using information poses a risk of harm to those whose
information is used. Some researchers
doubt that there are real risks to data
subjects from which they should be
protected (Evans, McNaughton et al.
2001 p 672), while others note that there
have been misuses of health information (Marwick 1996). In 1997 the Brit-
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ish Medical Journal published two
articles which defended the need for
epidemiological research data gathering without patients’ consent (Smith
1997; Doyal 1997). This stimulated
many letters to the editor. Researchers
argued that consent should not be dispensed with, but that instead research
should be better designed (Pfeffer and
Alderson 1997). Journalists pointed
out that consent is not obtained in
many research projects and presented
findings that the US Food and Drug
Administration had identified over
2000 instances of research proceeding
in the absence of consent during its
inspections of clinical trials (Epstein
and Sloat 1997).

4 Responses to the
demands of privacy
protection
At present there are two main ways
in which data custodians and researchers are responding to the increasing
demands for privacy protection. The
first is to seek informed consent from
those whose data is subject to collection in a registry or other health database. Data subjects are given
information about any intended uses
and offered the opportunity to refuse
inclusion of their data. This response
meets ethical requirements as well as
complying with legal requirements in
many jurisdictions. The second response is to develop mechanisms for
ensuring protection of privacy, on the
grounds that privacy is not breached
if the data are sufficiently de-identified
and protected such that they can not
be linked back to individuals. This response does not allow data subjects
to control the uses of their data, but it
does minimise the potential for individuals to be harmed.

5 Consent
Custodians of both research
databases and clinical information systems have commented on the practical
problems associated with seeking consent from large numbers of individuals. Database custodians have argued
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that seeking consent from individuals
for inclusion of health data in population research would result in unrepresentative sampling (AlShahi and
Warlow 2001), and that it is impractical
(Holman 2001), or undesirable (Evans,
McNaughton et al. 2001) or both
(Finkelstein 1999).
Despite the difficulties, some data
managers have set themselves to the
task of communicating with large numbers of people. For example, leaflets
were used in the UK to inform local
residents of a local record linkage
project involving the records of three
general practices, two healthcare
trusts, an ambulance service and a social service. The leaflets were distributed to 88,000 households (approx
225,000 residents). Only 82 calls were
received by the advertised information
line, while the information website received 1306 hits in six months. Participants were not asked to consent, but
were offered the opportunity to withdraw their data from the project. A total of 10 individuals asked for their
records to be excluded (Adams,
Budden et al. 2004).
There is some doubt, however, that
household leafleting is an effective
public education method. In a similar
project in South Staffordshire involving a population of 60,000 households,
follow up surveys were conducted with
general practice patients and shoppers
in the area. While there were no requests to opt out of this project, and a
large majority (80%) felt comfortable
with it, less than half were aware that
their data had been networked and only
15% understood that they could opt
out, despite the public education campaign. People were relatively uninterested in health data linkage, making it
a challenge to ensure that they were
made aware of these data linkage
projects (Adams, Budden et al. 2004).
The Mayo Clinic’s collection of over
5 million medical records have been
used to provide data for tens of thousands of studies, and the Rochester
Epidemiology Project which links these
records with those from other treatment centers has supported more than
a thousand publications describing the
natural history of various diseases
(Melton 1997). The advent of federal

privacy legislation (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act 2000) in the United States brought
with it the requirement for individual
patient consent and the Mayo Clinic
sought this. At that time 94% of current Mayo Clinic patients (and 97% at
a partner institution) agreed to provide
written consent for the use of their
records. This suggests two things;
one, that a large proportion of patients
will consent if given the opportunity;
and two, that the logistical problems
of obtaining consent from a large
number of potential research participants can be overcome.
From these examples, it would appear that a large proportion of people
in the general population (at least in
the UK and the USA) will not object to
health data linkage for clinical care and
for research purposes.
The practical problems identified by
database custodians are how to provide information to large numbers of
people, how to obtain and record consent from them and how to provide effective opt out options for the few
individuals who do refuse consent.
Model protocols for transferring health
and consent information between
heath facilities which automatically
protect transferred health information
according to the patients’ consent
conditions are in development. An example is the eConsent model described
by O’Keefe et al. This model captures
patients’ expressed wishes regarding
who can access their information, attaches these to existing or new electronic records (or parts of the record),
and applies the consent conditions to
grant or deny access requests
(O’Keefe, Greenfield et al. 2005).
Reducing the participation rate in
large population based studies by
omitting those who decline to consent
or those who cannot provide consent
(for example because they cannot be
traced, or have died) can undermine
the meaningfulness of epidemiological
research. Researchers faced with the
prospect of being required to seek individual consent to health data linkage have put forward examples of
research designs which would be frustrated (Bruinsma, Venn et al. 2000).
This finding is supported by other
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studies indicating that those who seek
to opt out have different demographic
profiles from those who consent to
have their health data linked for research purposes (Woolf, Rothemich et
al. 2000; Yawn, Yawn et al. 1998). For
example, voluntary recruitment into the
registry of the Canadian Stroke Network resulted in a seriously biased
group and the assessment that this
registry will never be able to provide a
representative data set (Tu, Willison
et al. 2004).
Some large population studies have,
however, obtained consent and found
few differences between those who
consented and those who did not. The
Norwegian Women and Cancer Study
invited 179,388 women to complete
their questionnaire. Response rates
were only 45 to 60% (depending on
age group) but there were few demographic differences between those who
did and those who did not participate
when they were compared using a national population register. This research group concluded that there was
no major selection bias introduced by
voluntary participation.

6 Obscuring links
between individuals and
data
An alternative to seeking informed
consent is to develop systems that
protect privacy during data linkage.
Security measures which are designed
to reduce risks to data subjects who
have not been offered the opportunity
to consent are often nominated as privacy protecting measures (Berman
2002; Evans, McNaughton et al. 2001).
Administrative procedures or business rules for record linkage processes
offer a high level of security to the
stored data, although reverse engineering can be employed to reassemble information into a form which can
be identified with individuals (Sweeney
2002). One methodology involves the
separation of personal identifiers from
clinical information and their separate
encryption by the reporting clinician,
submission of these data to a “trusted
third party” who allocates an identifier specific to the paired data items
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and forwards personal identifiers and
clinical data to separate repositories.
Clinical data from disparate databases
can only be linked by the “trusted third
party” using the unique identifier
which it allocated. Neither researchers
nor the specific disease registers are
provided with personal identifiers
(Churches 2003).
This system requires legal protection
and financial support from government
and reflects many of the elements of
the work of the Western Australian
Data Linkage Unit (Kelman, Bass et al.
2002). In Western Australia the custodians of disease registries and health
databases that contain both personal
identifiers and clinical information sign
memoranda of understanding which
authorise a trusted third party (the
Linkage Unit) to identify data concerning the same individual across different databases. The Linkage Unit
allocates unique anonymous identifiers for each individual which are specific to the particular research project.
The researcher then uses the unique
identifier to obtain clinical data directly
from each database and is the only
person to hold the complete file of
linked clinical data. Researchers hold
clinical but not identifying data, while
the linkage unit accesses personally
identifying information but not clinical data.
Other protocols have been proposed
which utilise public key cryptography
to obscure identifying information during data linkage between two or more
data bases (Agrawal, Evfimievski et al.
2003). While these protocols cannot
protect against collusion between a
researcher and a database to disclose
identifying information, they do offer
a high level of security. Protocols have
also been developed which allow data
linkage between databases without
disclosure of identifying information
to any party outside the originating
data source, or which allow extraction
of a cohort of data from a database
without revealing membership of the
cohort to the source database
(O’Keefe, Gu et al. 2004).
All of these methodologies to obscure data minimise the risk that health
information will be disclosed. Reduc-

ing risks to data subjects may enhance
their confidence and address their concerns, but it does not extend control
to them over the use and distribution
of their data.

7 Conclusion
Database custodians confront problems as they comply with privacy and
data protection requirements. They
may respond in a variety of ways. Some
responses have the effect of restricting research, other responses enable
research to proceed with privacy protection in place. Responses revolve
around either seeking consent, or using data management systems which
make it difficult to trace individuals
from data.
The technical solutions for protecting privacy are complex, which may
be one reason why they are not always
utilised. Information system developers have observed that functions such
as user authentication and data transfer audit may be ignored by health care
providers, even when these are available (Moehr and Daniel 1998).
In summary, there is unlikely to be a
single solution to the challenges posed
by performing data-based research
with adequate privacy protections.
Data custodians and researchers may
need to tailor their responses to types
of population or register, or to specific
research needs. There are difficulties
in engaging the population in debate
about data uses, and in getting researchers and health care professionals to use technical solutions where
these are available. Meeting these challenges to ensure high ethical standards in research involving databases
and registers requires time and effort,
but is necessary to maintain public
support for research.
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